Using data for 51 manufacturing and service sectors for the period 1970-2005 in 14 EU countries, this paper shows that employment protection legislation has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect on growth of value added and hours of work in more human capital intensive sectors. We interpret these …ndings in a generalised theoretical framework with technology adoption, skill biased technical change and labour market institutions. We claim that technology adoption depends both on the skill level of the workforce and on the capacity of …rms to optimally adjust their employment levels as technology changes. As a consequence, …ring costs have a relatively stronger impact in sectors in which technical change is more skill-biased and thus technology adoption is more important. Our empirical results are robust to various sensitivity checks such as interactions of human capital intensity with other country level variables, of employment protection with other sector level variables and endogeneity of …ring restrictions. We also show that the negative e¤ect of EPL is stronger the smaller the distance from the technology frontier and after the 1990s.
Introduction
Do labour market institutions a¤ect economic growth? If that is the case, which are the channels through which labour regulation a¤ects growth? How important are labour market institutions for the adoption of new technologies? Are these e¤ects di¤erentiated across industries? In this paper we try to answer the above questions by looking at the quantitative e¤ect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on growth of value added and hours of work across sectors in Europe during the period 1970-2005. We do this by investigating the heterogeneous e¤ects on industry growth of the interaction between a country's level of EPL and a sectoral measure of technology adoption intensity. 1 In a recent paper, Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) introduce skill biased technical change into a two sector version of the Nelson and Phelps's (1966) model of technology adoption: convincingly, they show that countries with higher levels of schooling tend to specialise in sectors with higher human capital intensity. In fact, skill biased technical change -associated with the ICT revolution that has been taking place since the beginning of the 1980s -should result in relatively faster productivity growth in skill intensive sectors (Caselli, 1999) . Hence, countries with higher human capital levels should be able to adopt the new technologiessuch as automated machinery and information and communication technologies -faster and therefore experience faster value added and employment growth in human capital intensive industries during the transition to the new steady state. 2 However, the technology adoption process depends not only on the skill level of the workforce in a particular sector, but also upon the capacity of …rms active in that sector to optimally adjust their employment levels as technology changes (Samaniego, 2006) . If sectors experience di¤erent rates of technical change, …rms operating in di¤erent sectors have heterogenous paths of adjustment of employment: in particular, the faster the rate of technical change, the higher the requirements for cutting or upgrading the workforce. 3 Hence, …ring costs and labour market institutions as employment protection legislation may have a relatively stronger impact in those sectors in which technical change is faster as they reduce the expected returns on adopting new technologies. In fact, for skill biased technical change at the world frontier to foster the specialisation in skill intensive sectors of countries with higher capacity of technology adoption, it is necessary that resources can be freely moved from low skill sectors to high skill ones. The existence of stringent employment protection legislation might slow down or even reduce this reallocation process, as recently noted, in the contest of a trade reform, by Kambourov (2009) . Moreover, Acemoglu (2003) shows that regulations in the labour market, by compressing the wage distribution, might induce …rms to invest more heavily in 1 By technology adoption we mean the capacity to fully exploit the potential of recently developed technologies, and not simply imitate well established ones. Leading examples are automated machineries, information and communication technologies, ‡exible manufacturing systems, computer controlled machines whose productivity potential is fully exploited by highly skilled workers (Caselli, 1999) . 2 Such mechanism is also con…rmed by abundant empirical evidence on the positive correlation between human capital and technology adoption: see Doms et al. (1997) , Berman et al. (1994) , Autor et al. (2003) , Machin and Van Reenen (1998) and Caselli and Coleman (2001) among others. More recently, Lewis (2011) shows that the skill composition of employed workers is positively associated to the adoption of automated machinery in manufacturing, while Bartel et al. (2007) …nd that the presence of information technologies enhancing equipment is positively associated with skill requirements of the workforce. Finally, Bresnahan et al. (2002) identify a positive correlation between IT, decentralised workplace organisation and human capital. 3 Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) …nd that technological advances increase job destruction and job reallocation while Antelius and Lundberg (2003) o¤er some evidence that the rate of job turnover is higher in industries with higher shares of skilled workers; in turn, Givord and Maurin (2004) …nd that the job loss rate is higher in sectors with a higher share of R&D and high skilled workers. technologies that are complementary to low skilled workers. The increased productivity of low skilled labour could therefore reduce the relative importance of skill biased technical change for countries with heavily regulated labour markets, and this might again cause slower growth in human capital intensive sectors in countries with such labour markets (see also Koeniger and Leonardi, 2007) . 4 During a period of strong skill biased technical change, employment protection legislation, by slowing down the adoption of the new technologies, might be more harmful in skill intensive sectors. This is because, as noted by Caselli (1999) , these are the industries that "might plausibly be expected to be at the forefront of the technology revolution". Of course, an important assumption behind this result is that employment protection legislation tends to reduce the adoption of ICT technologies. Some favourable empirical evidence in this respect is o¤ered in Figure 1 for a panel of 15 countries (the EU15 but Luxembourg plus the US) observed in the period 1990-2000. The Figure, as in Samaniego (2006) , shows that personal computers adoption rates (proxied by the log of pc per capita) tend to be higher in countries that, in the preceding …ve years, were characterised by lower degrees of employment protection. 5 Further empirical evidence on the negative correlation between employment protection legislation and adoption of ICT is also provided, for a panel of thirteen countries observed over the period 1992-99, by Gust and Marquez (2004) and by Pierre and Scarpetta (2006) , who …nd that more innovative …rms tend to report labour market regulations as more harmful. 4 Berdugo and Hadad (2008) o¤er another channel through which employment protection legislation might drive a country specialisation pattern away from human capital intensive industries. Their paper emphasises the burden imposed by …ring costs on the …rm's screening process, which is relatively more important for high tech …rms that tend to employ more high skilled workers. 5 It should be noted that the negative and signi…cant correlation between personal computer adoption rates and employtment protection legislation is based on a regression where we have controlled for the log of per capita GDP, the log of the average number of schooling years in the population aged between 25 and 64, a time trend and a full set of country …xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient of employment protection legislation in the regression is -0.35, with a p value of 0.07 and standard errors robust to arbitrary serial correlation within countries. The technology adoption data are taken from Comin and Hobijn (2010).
As we discuss in the theoretical section of this paper, by simply allowing technology adoption to also depend on employment protection legislation in a model with skill biased technical change as the one proposed by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009), we show how EPL could negatively a¤ect the specialisation pattern of countries by slowing down growth particularly in sectors with rapid technical change, such as human capital intensive sectors. This channel is strictly related to the mechanism identi…ed by Saint-Paul (1997) to understand the e¤ects of EPL on the pattern of international specialisation: in his theoretical framework, countries with higher levels of EPL tend to specialise in less innovative sectors to avoid additional …ring costs that are more likely to arise in sectors characterised by more drastic innovation. The link between labour market institutions, technology choice and economic performance has also been theoretically investigated in a recent paper by Poschke (2010) where the author presents a dynamic stochastic model of heterogeneous …rms with technology adoption and entry costs. The calibration exercise presented in the paper shows both that small entry costs reduce the attractiveness for …rms to adopt advanced technologies (thereby reducing aggregate output and productivity) and that the latter e¤ect is reinforced by the presence of a not competitive labour market.
In order to study the relations discussed above, in this paper, we analyse the e¤ect of employment protection legislation on growth of value added and hours of work in Europe using EUKLEMS data for 51 manufacturing and service sectors for 14 countries during the period 1970-2005. In particular, we interact an indicator of EPL at the country level with a sectoral measure of human capital intensity which is invariant across countries (i.e., years of schooling in the workforce at the industry level) and is derived from US census data (as in Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009 ). This methodology, …rst proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), has been proving popular among applied economists because it allows to overcome standard econometric problems of omitted variable bias and reverse causality through a di¤erence-indi¤erence approach.
Our results clearly suggest that EPL has a negative e¤ect on value added growth in more human capital intensive sectors. Our preferred estimates indicate that the growth rate differential between a sector at the 75th percentile of the human capital intensity distribution (production of other transport equipment) and a sector at the 25th percentile (tobacco) is in the range -0.5%/-0.9% in a country at the 75th percentile of the EPL distribution (Greece) with respect to a country at the 25th percentile (Austria). A similar, but slightly smaller, e¤ect is estimated for growth of hours of work. Finally, a signi…cant negative e¤ect on TFP growth is also found.
We check the robustness of this result considering various di¤erent speci…cations. First, we examine whether our interaction between EPL and human capital intensity partly captures other interactions of EPL with industry features that might be correlated with human capital intensity, such as R&D or physical capital intensity and sectoral riskiness. Second, we consider the role of alternative determinants of industry growth by including the relevant interactions between industry and country characteristics, such as the average years of schooling at the country level and the sectoral human capital intensity, the country capital output ratio and the industry physical capital intensity, the sectoral R&D intensity and the country R&D stock. Third, we include interactions between human capital intensity and country level variables potentially correlated with EPL such as union density, strike activity, wage bargaining coordination, the level of …nancial development and the presence of entry barriers. Furthermore, we also consider di¤erent indicators of EPL which take into account the increasing extensive use of …xed term positions in some European economies. Fourth, we consider the potential endogeneity of EPL by instrumenting it with political economy variables: to do this, we use the percentage of years of left-wing government over the sample period (Botero et al., 2004) , the presence of a dictatorship spell before 1970 (Bassanini et al., 2009 ) and the attitude taken by governments towards the development of labour unions in the early 20 th century (Mueller and Philippon, 2011) . Fifth, we consider the possibility that EPL may have a di¤erential impact on growth depending on the country's distance from the technological frontier. We …nally check that our main results are not driven by benchmarking bias using a two-step instrumental variable estimator recently proposed by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2010) . 6 We conclude that our robustness checks con…rm the baseline results.
We add to the previous literature in various directions. First, we explore the role of labour market regulations in shaping the relation between technology adoption and growth, an aspect substantially neglected so far. Moreover, by considering whether EPL disproportionately a¤ects growth in human capital intensive industries, we o¤er empirical evidence on the role played by labour market institutions in driving the pattern of specialisation. 7 We argue that human capital intensity is a simple and general measure of the sectoral technology adoption propensity. The average schooling level of the workforce is in fact strictly correlated to R&D or ICT intensity, which are other natural measures of technological advances. We claim that our measure correctly captures the ability to successfully introduce recently developed technologies, as for example ICT and related technical advances, and to fully exploit their potential. Moreover, the technology adoption stage may be conceptually kept distinct from other aspects of technological change, as the production of innovation which is perhaps best captured by R&D activities: in this regard, our result that EPL slows down growth particularly in human capital intensive industries survives even after controlling for an interaction between R&D intensity and EPL. Second, by using a long period of time, we are able to capture long run e¤ects of labour market regulation, whereas previous papers focused on short run dynamics mostly considering only the manufacturing sector during the 90s. Finally, we show that our empirical …ndings are robust to other possible channels through which EPL can in ‡uence growth. In this respect, on the one hand, we consider the possibility that EPL interacts with the industry natural layo¤ propensity, as in Bassanini et al. (2009) , or the degree of riskiness, as in Bartelsman et al. (2010) ; while, on the other hand, we experiment with other variables that may be correlated with technology adoption such as R&D or ICT intensity.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature; in Section 3 we present the theoretical framework; in Section 4 we describe the data; Section 5 contains our empirical methodology, while results are discussed in Section 6; we conclude in Section 7.
Related Literature
Our starting point is the literature on human capital and growth: in particular, we consider the role of human capital for technology adoption and growth in the spirit of Nelson and Phelps (1966) . 8 Within that framework, we follow Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) who 6 In fact, Ciccone and Papaioannou (2010) show that using industry data of a benchmark country as a proxy for the relevant industry characteristics (human capital intensity in our case) might lead to a signi…cant bias in parameter estimates whose direction is not clear a priori. 7 In this respect, our paper is strictly related to recent work by Bartelsman et al. (2010) , who provide evidence of a negative e¤ect of high …ring costs on employment especially in high-risk sectors. 8 Reviewing such literature is beyond the scope of this paper; see Krueger and Lindhal (2001) for a survey on human capital and growth. See Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) for the …rst empirical application of the technology adoption model. introduce skill biased technical change into the technology adoption model and provide robust evidence of strong human capital level and accumulation e¤ects on growth in more human capital intensive sectors.
One implicit assumption in this literature is that technology adoption is not costly and that …rms can adjust their workforce accordingly. However, in countries where labour markets are strictly regulated and employment protection legislation is pervasive, …rms'adjustment costs can be particularly high: thus EPL may reduce turnover of workers and consequently in ‡uence …rm performance and the expansion of skill intensive sectors. 9 As we discuss in the theoretical part of the paper, this intuition can be easily incorporated in a growth model of technology adoption with skill biased technical change, as the one recently proposed by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) , by simply allowing the technology adoption process to depend on EPL. Before discussing that simple extension, in what follows we brie ‡y review the other relevant contributions.
One strand of literature in particular analyses how EPL a¤ects growth through changes in the specialisation pattern of countries. Saint-Paul (1997) presents a model where EPL drives the comparative advantage of a country towards low-risk sectors in which innovation is more directed towards later stages in a product life cycle: as a result, countries with higher EPL tend to specialise in secondary innovation, while others tend to specialise in primary innovation (see also, Saint-Paul, 2002b). 10 Similarly, Samaniego (2006) argues that industry composition is a channel of primary importance to study the e¤ect of EPL on growth: in sectors in which technological progress is very fast, …rms have to continuously cut employment; as a result, countries with high …ring costs specialise in sectors in which technical progress is slow.
11
Along these lines, Bartelsman et al. (2010) develop a search-matching model with two sectors and di¤erent productivity shocks in which EPL reduces the share of the highly innovative sector in the economy as it makes exit more costly. By relatively reducing the attractiveness of the ICT sector, …ring restrictions disproportionately increase employment in low risk sectors. Related results are obtained by Poschke (2009) in an endogenous growth model in which the e¤ect of …ring costs on aggregate productivity growth is analysed through selection, reallocation and imitation. In that context, EPL is more stringent in the service sector, which uses information technologies more intensively and where …rms face higher variance of productivity shocks. 12 Similarly, industry di¤erences in volatility and labour market institutions at the country level can determine the pattern of comparative advantage; as a result, countries with more ‡exible labour markets tend to specialise in high volatility industries (Cue nat and Melitz, 2011).
While most of the above contributions concentrate on the e¤ects of EPL on the specialisation pattern of countries, a related literature highlights the direct link between EPL and productivity. In this spirit, Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) o¤er evidence that strict EPL can 9 Nickell et al. (2005) study the e¤ects of EPL on labour market outcomes. See Bertola (1994) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) for the aggregate e¤ects of labour legislation on growth. 10 Gri¢ th and Macartney (2010) o¤er empirical evidence consistent with these theoretical predictions. Using a sample of multinational …rms with establishments in di¤erent countries, they show that EPL can have di¤erent e¤ects on innovation: while higher levels of EPL reduce radical innovations, incremental innovations are positively related to stricter labour regulations.
11 Samaniego (2008) develops a model with technology adoption in which labour market rigidities interact with the rate of embodied technical progress resulting in di¤erences in aggregate outcomes across countries with di¤erent labour market regulations. 12 Samaniego (2010) uses European data at …rm level to study the relation between di¤erent measures of …rm turnover at the country level and investment-speci…c technical change at the industry level, …nding a positive long run relationship between them. have a strong negative impact on productivity because it diminishes the incentives to innovate and adopt new technologies. Similar results are found by Bassanini et al (2009) who use EU-KLEMS productivity data at sectoral level for a set of OECD countries, and …nd that EPL lowers total factor productivity growth disproportionately in sectors in which the technology requires continuous adjustment in employment and where the natural layo¤ rate is higher. 13 Along the same lines, Micco and Pages (2007) provide evidence that more stringent labour legislation reduces job turnover in manufacturing, and that this e¤ect is more pronounced in sectors that are intrinsically more volatile; moreover, they …nd that the decline in entry of …rms reduces both employment and value added in the high reallocation sectors. Additional empirical results are o¤ered by Autor et al. (2007) who show that while EPL may have a positive impact on labour productivity because …rms could engage in capital deepening, EPL always has a negative e¤ect on total factor productivity as it distorts the adoption of production techniques.
Finally, in the tradition of the new Schumpeterian growth theory, some papers analyse whether EPL has a di¤erential e¤ect on productivity depending on the country's position relative to the technology frontier. Bartelsman et al. (2008) estimate a production function augmented with an interaction between EPL and distance from technological frontier for the period 1991-2004. They …nd that EPL depresses total factor productivity and the e¤ect is stronger the closer the country is to the technology frontier. Similar results are obtained by Aghion et al (2009) who …nd that both product and labour market regulation may have di¤erent e¤ects on total factor productivity growth depending on the country's position relative to the technological frontier.
Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical framework directly borrows from Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009), which incorporates skill biased technological change in the model of Nelson and Phelps (1966) . We use such a framework to illustrate the dynamics of growth and sectoral specialisation of economies in which …ring restrictions slow down growth in high-skill intensive sectors by in ‡uencing the technology adoption mechanism.
In this framework, di¤erent countries are denoted by the subscript c; within each country there are di¤erent sectors of activity, denoted by subscript s. The labour force is composed of high and low skill workers: M c;t is the supply of high skilled human capital in country c at time t, while L c;t is the supply of low skilled human capital in a country c at time t: Let us also de…ne H = M=L: Each type of labour has its own e¢ ciency level, denoted A 14 Output in sector s, in country c, at time t is produced according to a Cobb Douglas production function
where D captures country level e¢ ciency and E industry speci…c technology. We now analyse how steady state production levels depend on a country capacity to adopt new technologies. Suppose constant e¢ ciency growth at the frontier for high and low skilled labour d A
and M c are constant. In steady state, e¢ ciency in each country grows as at the world frontier. Then using equation (1), we obtain the steady state level of e¢ ciency for each type of labour:
Equation above indicates that the higher the capacity to adopt technology, the closer the country is to the world technological frontier. In this framework, human capital levels and …ring restrictions work in opposite directions, as they have a di¤erent e¤ect on . To see how EPL a¤ects steady state e¢ ciency levels, we write the elasticity of such levels with respect to …ring restrictions
The sign of the latter depends on the sign of f 0 (H c;t ; EP L c;t ), which is assumed to be negative. Note also, that the negative e¤ect of EPL on e¢ ciency is increasing in the rate of growth of e¢ ciency at the frontier g f : Steady state output can be written using equations (2) and (3): 14 We acknowledge that others have proposed structural models in which the microfoundations of …ring costs are made explicit. In this direction, Saint-Paul (1997) models …ring costs as a tax on job destruction that a¤ects both wages and prices and thus drives the pattern of comparative advantage between more and less innovative sectors of the economy across countries. A similar concept is used by Poschke (2009) that identi…es two roles for EPL in an endogenous growth model: a tax on exit of …rms and an adjustment cost on employment. In his paper, …ring costs in ‡uence …rms's entry and exit decisions, thus a¤ecting productivity through selection and imitation. Finally, Samaniego (2006) , proposes a vintage capital model with exogenous growth in which the adjustment costs generated by EPL has an e¤ect on the optimal plant size and on the timing of job destruction. Hence, the interaction of exogenous di¤erences in the rate of technical change across sectors and …ring costs generate di¤erences in macroeconomic variables.
where we used M = HL and assumed full employment. Steady state production in the high relative to the low human capital industry can be written as Z c;t = X 1;c;t =X 0;c;t ; where we follow Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) and assume that sector 1 uses only high skilled labour and sector 0 uses only low skilled labour.
To analyse out of steady state dynamics and derive our estimating equation, we follow Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) and assume at time T there is an increase in the e¢ ciency of skilled labour at the world frontier. Hence, we consider the growth rate di¤erential between two countries c and q for t > T . Formally, we denote logs with lower case letters and write
where g(h; epl) is strictly increasing in h and decreasing in epl. Value added reads as Y s;c;t P s;t X s;c;t , where P s;t are international prices. Then, the production function implies that y s;c;t y s;c;t y s;c;T
The latter combined with equation (6) yields
where the …rst term in brackets is a country speci…c e¤ect, the second is the industry speci…c e¤ect, while captures (unskilled) labour augmenting technical change. The two remaining interaction terms (h c;T )s and (epl c;T )s are implicitly derived from a linear speci…cation of the function f (H c;t ; EP L c;t ) which was discussed above and on which we focus in the empirical part of the paper. The intuition underlying the last equation is that in year t all countries in the human capital intensive sector have been converging to a new state state, but as those with higher human capital levels and lower EPL have been converging to a higher steady state, EPL and human capital tend to a¤ect growth only in the (skill intensive) sector s.
We can also note, given the General Purpose Technology nature of most of the new ICT technologies that became available since the end of the 1970s, that in sector s; production might not have increased that much in the short run. In fact, given the time of experimentation necessary to fully appreciate the potential of new technologies and to reorganise the …rms's production structure, the e¤ect of EPL might be expected to have been less strong in the 70s' and 80s'than, say, over the past 20 years, a prediction that will be borne out in our empirical application.
Data

Country-Industry Level
Data for real value added and hours of work are from the public release of the EUKLEMS database (see Inklaar et al., 2008 ) which contains detailed information on various industry-level variables for 14 OECD countries for the period 1970-2005. We extract the available data for 51 sectors according to the ISIC Rev3.1 classi…cation for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. We drop other EU countries as data were not available for the complete covered period and the US, as the latter is used as the benchmark in our di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach. The industries considered in this work span from agriculture to manufacturing and market services, while we do not consider public administration and defense, community personal services, education, health and social works (see Tables 1 and 2 ).
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] For many countries we do not have information about all 51 sectors, but in no case the number of industries falls below 35, with most countries in the range 45-51. Overall, our sample is based on 595 (618) observations in the case of value added (hours) growth regressions.
Industry Level
Our measure of human capital intensity at the industry level is derived from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series database which collects individual microdata from US census. To construct such a measure, we closely follow Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009). We impute average years of schooling for each educational attainment in 1970 as follows: 0 (no schooling), 1 (Grades 1-4), 6 (Grades 5-8), 10 (Grades 9-11), 12 (12 Grade), 14 (College 1-3), 17 (College 4+). 15 As the IPUMS database uses a di¤erent industry classi…cation from the one in the EUKLEMS data, we recode sectors according to our de…nition. 16 Then, for each sector, we calculate the share of employees in each educational attainment level and multiply this share by the average years of schooling calculated above. 17 We also consider another industry level variable that has been recently used to study the relationship between EPL and productivity (see above): while Micco and Pages (2007) assume that …ring restrictions are more likely to be binding in sectors with high gross job turnover rates, Bassanini et al (2009) prefer instead to use an industry's layo¤ rate, which they argue represents a better proxy for the a priori "bindness" of …ring restrictions. In order to verify whether our results are robust to controlling for the theoretical mechanism considered by Bassanini et al. (2009), we have built a proxy for each industry's speci…c layo¤ propensity, using data from the US 1994 CPS Displaced Workers Supplement. 18 In particular, as in Bassanini et al. (2009) , the layo¤ propensity of an industry has been proxied with the fraction of workers that had been displaced in the years covered by the 1994 survey.
Other sector level variables that we consider in the paper are the physical capital, R&D, ICT and risk intensity. The …rst has been computed, as in Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) , as the ratio between real gross capital stock and value added in the US in 1970 using data taken from the EUKLEMS; in turn, R&D intensity is proxied by the R&D expenditure to value added ratio in the US in 1973 using data taken from the OECD ANBERD database; 19 ICT intensity was computed as the share of ICT expenditure in total investment outlays using EUKLEMS data; …nally, as a proxy for risk intensity we use the standard deviation of the distribution of output growth across …rms in the US, which has been made recently available for the manufacturing sector in the EUKLEMS database for the year 1992.
Country Level
The main country level variables are in Table 3 . The indicator of EPL at the country level is taken from Checchi and Lucifora (2002) who originally used the one by Nickell et al (2005) . Data are …ve years average starting from the 60s; we construct an average measure of EPL from 70-75 to 95-00 that varies from 0 (less regulated) to 2 (most regulated). One pitfall of this indicator of EPL is that there is no information for Portugal and Greece: for these two countries we therefore use data taken from the most recent release of the OECD's employment protection legislation indicators, appropriately rescaled to compare it with that of Nickell et al (2001) . 20 As a robustness check, we also use, as a measure of EPL, the recent OECD indicator just mentioned: in particular, we use the OECD EPL indicator EP_v1, which is an unweighted average of employment protection for regular and temporary contracts, and we construct an average measure for the period 1985-2005. 21 Furthermore, as an additional robustness check, we also consider the OECD index EP_v2, which measures EPL for the period 1998-2005 as a weighted average of EPL for regular contracts, temporary contracts and collective dismissals.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Remaining control variables are taken from di¤erent sources. From the Barro and Lee (2001) dataset we extract di¤erent measures of schooling at the country level such as years of schooling in the population with more than 25 years in 1970 and the average growth rate of this measure over the period 1970-1999. 22 From Checchi and Lucifora (2002) we also extract measures of strike activity (number of employees participating in strikes over total number of employees), union density (number of enrolled over total employees) and the tax wedge. In turn, from Visser (2009), we have taken an index of coordination of wage bargaining, which takes values between 5 (i.e. economy wide bargaining) and 1 (fragmented bargaining, mostly at the company level).
Other country level controls come from conventional sources. Financial development is measured as the ratio between domestic credit to private sector and GDP and is taken from the World Bank Global Development Finance database; a measure for the rule of law has been proxied with the structure and security of property rights index reported in the Economic Freedom of the World database; trade openness is computed as the ratio between the sum of export and imports over total GDP; GDP per capita is from the most recent release (6.3) of the Penn World Tables; our measure of product market regulation is calculated as an average of entry barriers over the period of analysis taken from the OECD product market regulation database; …nally, our measure of TFP is computed assuming that GDP is produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology with a labour share of one third using data from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005).
A few more words are necessary for the computation of the physical capital-output ratio. We follow Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) by computing the capital to output ratio in 1950 as
, where I k =Y is the average investment rate in physical capital between 1950 and 1970, g and n are the average rate of growth of labour productivity and of population over the same period, respectively, and is the depreciation rate which is set equal to 8%. We then apply a standard perpetual inventory method to derive the capital stock (and therefore the capital output ratio) for 1970 and 1990.
The R&D stock data is obtained using data from di¤erent sources. For all countries but Greece, Belgium, Austria and Portugal we use the EUKLEMS data on the R&D stock for the market economy, which were constructed applying the perpetual inventory method to R&D expenditure data. As the EUKLEMS series start in 1980, we compute the R&D stock for previous years by applying the perpetual inventory method backwards to 1973 using OECD data on R&D expenditure from the OECD ANBERD database. 23 For Greece, Belgium, Austria and Portugal we use the OECD expenditure data and apply the perpetual inventory method forward to derive estimates of the R&D stock for 1973 and 1990. 24 
Estimation and Identi…cation
Our empirical framework is similar to that of Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) and is based on the di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and subsequently employed in many other empirical applications. In order to evaluate whether employment protection legislation tends to reduce growth particularly in human capital intensive industries, we estimate di¤erent versions of the baseline equation: where the dependent variable is the average rate of growth of value added or total hours worked in country c and sector s over the period 1970-2005; v s ; u c and " s;c are sector and country speci…c …xed e¤ects and a conventional error term, respectively; HCIN T s is the human capital intensity of each industry; EPL is the country average degree of employment protection over the period 1970-2000. Furthermore, our regression speci…cation takes into account other possible determinants of industry growth by including the relevant country and sector interactions W 0 s Z c , such as the country years of schooling in 1970 (and the improvements in schooling years over the sample period) and the sector human capital intensity in 1970; the country capital-output ratio and the sectoral physical capital intensity in 1970, and the industry R&D intensity and the country R&D stock in 1973. Finally, we take into account possible convergence e¤ects by including in all regression speci…cations the log of the dependent variable at the beginning of the period.
In equation (9) country dummies should pick up the e¤ects of any omitted variable at the country level, such as the quality of institutions, macroeconomic conditions over the period, social norms, etc.; in turn, industry …xed e¤ects may capture di¤erences in technologies or sector speci…c patterns of growth. A negative sign for the coe¢ cient would indicate that countries with higher degrees of employment protection legislation tend to grow less in schooling intensive industries: in other words, employment protection legislation tends to slow down growth disproportionately in human capital intensive industries, and as a result high-EPL countries tend to specialise in less schooling intensive industries.
The inclusion of W 0 s Z c is important because there is evidence that countries with an abundant factor tend to specialise in industries that use intensively that factor (Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009). Controlling for the relevant country-industry interactions should allow us to take into account the possibility that W s (e.g. an industry physical capital intensity) and HCIN T s or Z c (e.g. a country capital stock, the accumulation of human capital, etc.) and EP L c are correlated: in this case, the omission of the relevant country-industry interactions would tend to bias the OLS estimates of . In addition to this, given that there might be other country-level variables, potentially correlated with EPL, that might interact with industry schooling intensity, as a robustness check we also include additional interactions between HCIN T and country level variables such as GDP per capita, …nancial development, the respect of property rights, the stock of R&D capital, union density and other labour market institutions.
Moreover, in order to consider the possibility that EPL might interact with some other industry characteristics, in some speci…cations we augment our regressions with interactions between EPL and sector level variables, such as R&D, physical capital, riskiness and layo¤ intensities. Furthermore, given that there might be reasons to believe that causality might go in the other direction, namely from growth to employment protection legislation (see below), we also estimate a version of equation (9) in which we instrument EPL with di¤erent variables rooted in the history of each country (existence of dictatorship spells before 1970 and attitudes of the political system towards labour unions at the beginning of the 20 th century) and political economy variables (percentage of years with a left-wing government). 25 Finally, we check that our main results are not sensitive to the benchmarking bias highlighted by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2010).
Results
Basic Results
We …rst investigate whether human capital intensive industries grew faster in countries with less strict employment protection legislation over the period . In columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 we measure industry growth using value added (VAg), while in columns 4 to 6 we proxy the changes in production structure with the growth rate in total hours worked (Hg). In columns 1 and 4 we start with a parsimonious speci…cation of equation (9), as we control only for country and sector …xed e¤ects and for initial di¤erences in the size of sectors (by including the log of value added or hours worked in 1970). The coe¢ cient of the interaction between the average level of employment protection over the period 1970-2005 and human capital intensity is negative and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level in both columns 1 and 4. In the case of value added growth, the coe¢ cient of -0.00805 implies a yearly growth di¤erential of 0.89% between the sector at the 75 th percentile (production of other transport equipment) and at the 25 th percentile (tobacco) of human capital intensity in a country at the 25 th percentile of EPL (such as Austria, with an average of 1.119 over the period) compared with a country at the 75 th percentile of EPL (such as Greece, with an average of 1.797). 26 If we measure industry growth using data on total hours worked, we …nd a slightly smaller e¤ect, namely -0.00668, which implies a growth di¤erential of about 0.74% between the sector at the 75 th and the 25 th percentile of schooling intensity in a country at the 25 th percentile of EPL compared to a country at the 75 th percentile of EPL.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
As shown in Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009), human capital intensive industries tend to grow faster in countries with higher initial levels of schooling, the intuition being that, if technological progress has been skilled labour augmenting over the sample period, higher levels of schooling should foster the adoption of new technologies. However, if employment protection legislation were lower in countries with more years of schooling, then the interaction term between EPL and human capital intensity might be downward biased if we do not control for years of schooling. In order to check for this possibility, in columns 2 and 5 we have included interaction terms between human capital intensity and both the years of schooling at the country level in 1970 and the country level increase in average years of schooling over the sample period. Regression results show a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient for the human capital level interaction, and a positive but slightly insigni…cant coe¢ cient for the accumulation term, broadly con…rming the results of Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) for a di¤erent set of countries-industries and for a longer period of time. 27 Reassuringly, the interaction term between EPL and human capital intensity is still negative and statistically signi…cant.
Finally, in columns 3 and 6 we drop the interaction between EPL and human capital intensity in order to compare our results with those reported by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) in their Table 3 , column 1: in the case of the value added regression we …nd both a level and a growth e¤ect of human capital, with an order of magnitude that is very similar to that implied by the estimates reported in Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009): interestingly, we …nd that in columns 3 and 6 the magnitude of the interaction terms between human capital intensity and both the years of schooling at the beginning of the period and its accumulation over the period go up, probably suggesting an upwards bias associated to the omission of the EPL-schooling intensity interaction. 28 Our model speci…cation, as well as our empirical …ndings, suggest that EPL tends to depress value added growth particularly in high human capital intensive industries. However, because in our model EPL a¤ects value added growth through its e¤ect on technical change in human capital intensive industries, one should also expect that TFP growth is negatively a¤ected by EPL in such industries. In turn, as discussed by Autor et al. (2007) , the e¤ect on labour productivity growth is not clear, given the a priori uncertain e¤ect of EPL on employment, as …ring restrictions reduce both job creation and destruction. For these reasons we run the 26 If we consider the two countries with the highest and the lowest levels of EPL over the 1970-2005 period, namely Portugal (2.000) and the UK (0.337), the annual growth di¤erential could be as high as 2.1%. 27 In the case of the value added growth regression, the coe¢ cient of the interaction between human capital intensity and the initial level of human capital implies an annual growth di¤erential of about 0.55% between the sector at the 75 th percentile and at the 25 th percentile of human capital intensity in a country at the 75 th percentile of years of schooling distribution compared with a country at the 25 th percentile. 28 For robustness checks to possible outliers and in ‡uential observations we also run the speci…cations in Table 4 dropping, one at a time, each sector and then each country. The interaction term between human capital intensity and EPL remains negative, statistically signi…cant and with very similar magnitudes to that reported in Table 4. above regressions with TFP growth and labour productivity as dependent variables. 29 Our results, which are available upon request, con…rm that the interaction term between human capital intensity and EPL has a negative e¤ect on TFP growth: in fact the coe¢ cient (t statistic) varies between -0.0135 (-1.96) and -0.0125 (-1.76) depending on the speci…cation adopted. On the other hand we obtain a negative (but not statistically signi…cant) e¤ect of EPL on labour productivity growth. This result is in line with the one found by Autor et al. (2007) in the manufacturing sector in the US. As they suggest, one possible mechanism behind this result is that the increase in adjustment costs of labour pushes …rms to increase capital investment and/or change the composition of the labour force with ambiguous e¤ects on labour productivity.
In Table 5 we try to address possible endogeneity concerns of EPL. There can be di¤erent reasons that can make EPL endogenous: for example, EPL may be simply picking up the e¤ects of some country level omitted variables that tend to a¤ect growth especially in human capital intensive industries (see below); alternatively, EPL and growth might be jointly determined if a country that specialises in low human capital intensity and slow growth industries is also more likely to adopt a high degree of employment protection legislation (see, for example, Saint Paul (2002a), for a theoretical model).
We use di¤erent instruments for EPL. 30 The …rst, quite standard in the literature, is the percentage of years of left-wing governments over the sample period: the economic rationale of using this instrument is that the country level intensity of labour regulations has been found to depend on the political power of the left (Botero et al., 2004) . For the second instrument we instead follow Bassanini et al. (2009) and we build a dummy equal to one for those countries that experienced a dictatorship spell before 1970 (excluding World War II) and zero otherwise, the intuition being that historical evidence suggests that fascist dictatorships tended to protect workers against unfair dismissals due to their paternalistic views of labour relations.
Finally, we built dummies that proxy the attitude taken by governments towards the development of labour unions in the early 20 th century. Using a taxonomy proposed by Crouch (1993) and recently used as an instrument for the quality of today's labour relations by Mueller and Philippon (2011), it is possible to group countries into three categories, namely political inhibitors (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece), political facilitators (Germany, Austria and The Netherlands) and political neutrals (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK). The …rst group is composed by countries whose government highly oppositional stance against the development of labour unions led to highly con ‡icting and radical labour movements; in turn, the second category considers countries whose governments coopted labour unions into the system, which in turn led to cooperative labour unions; …nally, the third category groups countries that can be considered as an intermediate case (neutral). The economic justi…cation for using these dummies as instruments for EPL is that, in political inhibitor countries, the radical and con ‡icting labour unions might have pushed in the past century for legislations aimed to protect workers against unfair dismissals, unlike what might have happened in most facilitator or neutral countries, where agreements between labour unions and employers are more likely and therefore the necessity for unions to push for 29 For lack of data in the EUKLEMS database, the TFP growth regressions have been run on a sample of 26 industries (without Portugal and Greece) over the period 1990-05. See the robustness section below for additional regressions run on the same estimation period. 30 We also instrument the level of schooling with its lagged values as suggested by a large literature on the endogeneity of human capital on growth. Moreover, in the context of our study, in countries with high levels of EPL, workers can invest more in human capital to increase their probability of getting a job (or reduce the probability of being …red). Results are available upon request and con…rm …ndings presented below. employment protection legislation might be less strong.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
In columns 1 and 5 of Table 5 we instrument the interaction of human capital intensity with EPL with the interaction of human capital intensity with the left wing government indicator and the dictatorship spell dummy. First stage results, reported in the bottom part of the Table, suggest that both variables are signi…cant and with the expected sign: countries that experienced a dictatorship spell and that had many years of left wing governments also tend to have stronger EPL. Moreover, the Hansen J statistics rejects at the 10% level the null hypothesis that the instruments are correlated with the error term and the KleibergenPaap LM and F statistics do not suggest problems of underidenti…cation or weak instruments problems. 31 Second stage results suggest that the human capital intensity-EPL interaction is always negative and statistically signi…cant with a magnitude which is only slightly lower than that reported in Table 4 for the OLS case. In columns 2 and 6 we check the robustness of these results by instrumenting the interaction between human capital intensity and EPL with the interaction of human capital intensity with the left wing government indicator and the dummies for cooperative and neutral labour origins. First stage results suggest that countries with neutral and cooperative labour origins tend to have a lower degree of EPL, while second stage results con…rm that EPL tends to signi…cantly reduce growth particularly in human capital intensive industries. 32 In columns 3 and 7 we use the dictatorship spell dummy and the labour origin dummies as instruments for EPL and main results are broadly con…rmed. Finally, in columns 4 and 8 we jointly consider all three sets of instruments: again, the human capital intensity-EPL interaction is negative and statistically signi…cant and …rst stage results do not display evidence of weak identi…cation and weak instrument problems. 33 We then test the robustness of our main results to some of the other determinants of industry growth suggested in the literature by including the relevant country and sector interactions W 0 s Z c . Moreover, because human capital intensity is quite di¤erent from other sector-level intensity measures that have been previously used in the literature to analyse the e¤ect of EPL on productivity growth, we also assess whether interacting EPL with other sector level intensity measures a¤ects our main result that EPL tends to reduce growth disproportionately in human capital intensive industries.
First, as in Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009), in column 1 of Table 6 we include an interaction term between a country capital-output ratio and a sector physical capital intensity to take into account the possibility that, if physical and human capital intensity are correlated, then the interaction between schooling intensity and EPL might be picking up the e¤ect of a country physical capital stock: parameter estimates show that our results are basically unchanged and the coe¢ cient of the physical capital interaction term is not statistically signi…cant. 34 In column 2, we interact R&D intensity with our measure of EPL. As expected, more R&D intensive sectors grow less in countries with higher level of EPL: in particular, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is negative and statistically signi…cant at 10% level. However, the latter e¤ect becomes insigni…cant when we jointly consider the role of human 31 Underidenti…cation and weak instruments tests are availble from the authors upon request. 32 Again, we do not have evidence of weak instrument problems. 33 We have also explored the use of legal origin dummies as excluded instruments (as in Bassanini et al., 2009 ) and our main results are virtually unaltered. 34 We also consider the interaction between an industry R&D intensity and the R&D stock at the country level obtaining very similar results to those reported in column 1 of Table 6. capital and R&D intensity in column 3; interestingly, the negative e¤ect of the interaction of EPL with human capital intensity stands out. 35 This result may suggest that EPL slows down growth by a¤ecting the adoption of technology rather than the production of innovation. Following Samaniego (2006), we further check this result calculating a measure of ICT intensity at sectoral level (proxied by the share of ICT in total investment spending in the US as of 1970, using data from EUKLEMS) and interacting this measure with EPL: results in columns 4 and 5 are very similar to those found in the case of R&D.
[Insert Table 6 about here] Bartelsman et al. (2010) note that the proportion of high skilled workers in a sector is positively related to the riskiness of that sector, proxied by the observed variance of labour productivity within an industry averaged across countries. Therefore it might be important to take into account the possibility that our interaction is picking up such correlation. Hence, in column 6, we add an interaction term between our measure of sector riskiness and EPL. In particular, we use the standard deviation of the distribution of output growth across …rms in the US. 36 Results indicate that although EPL tends to depress growth in risky sectors, the interaction term is not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels; in turn, the interaction term between human capital intensity and EPL is negative and statistically signi…cant. Similar results are obtained in column 7 when we interact EPL with a sectoral measure of layo¤ intensity (as in Bassanini et al, 2009 ), i.e., considering the negative e¤ects of EPL on reallocation of workers. Finally, in column 8 we consider the role of physical capital intensity interacted with EPL: again, including this control doesn't a¤ect our result. 37 We conduct additional robustness analysis in Table 7 . In column 1 and 2 we use two di¤er-ent measures of EPL directly available from the OECD as discussed in previous subsections. The …rst is an unweighted average of sub-indicators for regular contracts and temporary contracts, while the second, available only from 1998 onwards, is a weighted sum of sub-indicators for regular contracts (weight 5/12), temporary contracts (weight 5/12) and collective dismissals (weight 2/12). In fact, the second indicator should account for the structural characteristics of some EU countries, in which strong employment regulations induce …rms to make intensive use of …xed-term positions, that might have di¤erent degrees of employment protection with respect to the regular ones. Because the OECD indices have a slightly higher range of variation, the coe¢ cient in column 1 is not directly comparable with those reported in previous tables: nevertheless, the main result of a negative e¤ect of EPL on growth in human capital intensive sectors holds. 38 The e¤ect is reinforced in column 2 which better takes into account the increasing role of temporary contracts in some (more regulated) labour markets. Then, in columns 3 to 5 we consider whether EPL is simply picking up the e¤ect of other labour market institutions on growth. In particular, we alternatively add interaction terms between human capital intensity and union density, number of strikes, and the tax wedge. Finally, in column 6, we also consider the role of wage coordination and centralisation as the e¤ect of EPL can be neutralised by wage bargaining. The empirical estimates show that the interaction between 35 Note that data availability allows us to consider R&D intensity only in the manufacturing sectors. As we show in Table 9 , the e¤ect in that macro-sector is stronger, this explains the higher magnitude of the interaction between human capital intensity and EPL. 36 Given that our proxy for sector riskness is available only for the manufacturing sectors in 1992, the regression presented in column 6 refers to the manufacturing sectors for the period 1990-2005. 37 Similar results are obtained when we consider hours of work; results are available upon request. 38 We have also used the employment law index of Botero et al. (2004) and our main results are virtually unaltered.
schooling intensity and EPL is still negative and statistically signi…cant at either 1% or 5%, and that the interactions of schooling intensity with all other labour market institutions are insigni…cant. 39 [Insert Table 7 about here] A potential criticism to using US industry data as a proxy for an industry human capital intensity might generate non-negligible bias for the human capital intensity-EPL interaction term, whose direction is not even clear a priori. In order to check the robustness of our result we therefore employ the two-step IV estimator recently suggested by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2010) , to whom we refer for an in-depth discussion of the derivations.
In the …rst stage we estimate, for all countries but the US, the following equation with OLS :
ln y s;c;1970
where s are industry speci…c slopes and the other symbols are as in equation (9). Ciccone and Papaioannou (2010) show that the "true" human capital intensity could then be built (netting out country e¤ects) as the predicted human capital intensity for the country with the most ‡exible labour market (the US), as: Table 8 : as we can see, the human capital intensity-EPL interaction is negative and statistically signi…cant, with a magnitude larger than in the OLS case, suggesting the existence of attenuation bias in the OLS estimates. 40 [Insert Table 8 about here]
In the remaining columns of Table 8 we explore in some detail the possibility that EPL is simply proxing the e¤ects of some other country variables that tend to a¤ect value added growth particularly in human capital intensive industries, such as the capital output ratio, the level of …nancial development, the respect of property rights, the per capita income level, the country stock of R&D capital, and the degree of product market regulation (proxied by the OECD indicator of entry barriers in network sectors). Our empirical …ndings con…rm that a higher level of EPL tends to signi…cantly reduce value added growth particularly in human capital intensive industries; furthermore, none of the additional controls turns out to be statistically signi…cant. 41 Main results are con…rmed for hours of work, which are not reported for space reasons. 39 In regressions not reported, but available from the authors, we also consider the interaction between human capital intensity and duration of unemployment bene…ts with very similar results. We also measure a country schooling level with the percentage of the population who completed secondary or tertiary education. The results con…rm that higher EPL tends to a¤ect disproportionately growth in human capital intensive industries. Finally, very similar results hold when we measure growth with hours of work. 40 The …rst stage is an OLS regression of HCIN T s EP L c;1970 05 on a set of country and sector dummies, initial conditions and d HCIN T s EP L c;1970 05 . Both the Kleibergen-Paap LM and F statistics do not suggest problems of underidentifcation or weak instrument problems. Results obtained for hours of work are very similar. 41 We also run regression considering the interaction between the degree of openness to trade and human capital intensity with very similar results.
Robustness
In this subsection we check whether there are important di¤erences between the two subperiods 1970-1990 and 1990-2005 and between manufacturing and non manufacturing industries; …nally, we check whether the impact of EPL changes with a country's distance from the technological frontier.
In Table 9 we start running a baseline regression for the two sub-periods 1970-1990 and 1990-2005 (columns 1-2 and 5-6 for value added and hours of work respectively). Our a priori expectation is that the e¤ect of EPL should be stronger in the second period. This is because there is empirical evidence (e.g., Caselli and Coleman, 2002) suggesting that the new technologies that started to be available at the end of the 1970s have been relatively more skill biased than those prevailing before: if we take into account the adjustment costs and the time that is often required for managers to fully appreciate the potential of new technologies and to incorporate them into the companies'routines, as well as the General Purpose Technology nature of ICT, then one may think that skilled labour augmenting technical change might have been relatively weaker in the 1970s and 1980s compared to the 1990s and early 2000s. But if this is the case, then one can also think that a more stringent employment protection legislation should have been more binding in human capital intensive industries precisely over the period 1990-2005, rather than in the previous two decades. As we can see from columns 1-2 and 5-6, both the value added and hours regressions suggest that the interaction between EPL and schooling intensity had a negative e¤ect in both sub-periods, but also that it is statistically signi…cant only in the most recent period, thus con…rming our a priori expectations. 42 [Insert Table 9 about here]
In columns 3-4 and 7-8 we split the sample between manufacturing and non manufacturing industries in order to examine whether there is any sector level heterogeneity in the interaction between EPL and schooling intensity. Before discussing the results we should however bear in mind that this split entails a severe degrees of freedom loss, especially in the case of the non manufacturing regression. As we can see, EPL tends to signi…cantly reduce growth in human capital intensive industries both in the case of manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, although the e¤ect is much stronger in the former case. 43 Finally, in Table 10 we allow the interaction between schooling intensity and EPL to vary with the country's distance from the technological frontier. The intuition is that EPL is likely to be more binding for a country near the technological frontier because in that case productivity growth is more likely to arise from radical innovations rather then from innovations at the margin or simply from imitation and adoption of existing technologies (Gri¢ th and Macartney, 2010; Saint Paul, 2002b). In the …rst column we run a baseline version of equation (9) with only the log of beginning of the period value added as control variable plus a triple interaction between schooling intensity, EPL and the country's distance 42 If we run similar regressions for the subperiods 1970-80 and 1980-90 we …nd that the interaction between human capital intensity and EPL increases in absolute value in the second period, although we can still not reject the null hypothesis that is equal to zero. 43 We also divide our sectors into ICT (including both ICT producing and using industries) and Non-ICT, using a de…nition proposed by Van Ark et al. (2003) and we run separate regressions for the two groups. The idea is to verify whether human capital intensity is simply capturing the more or less extensive use of ICT. Our regression results (estimates avaiable from the authors upon request) show that in both the value added and hours regressions the interaction between human capital intensity and EPL is negative and statistically signi…cant with a very similar magnitude across the two groups.
from the technological frontier. The latter variable has been computed as the ratio between US TFP and country c TFP at the beginning of the period and therefore a higher value indicates a country far from the technology frontier. To fully saturate the model we have also included an interaction term between schooling intensity and a country's distance from the technology frontier. Empirical results show that EPL tends to disproportionately reduce growth in high schooling industries but particularly in countries that are closer to the technological frontier. In order to facilitate comparisons with results displayed, in, say, Table 4 , let us consider the 25 th percentile of TFP Distance -which corresponds to a country with a TFP in 1970 about 11% lower than the US level -and the 75 th percentile of TFP Distance -which corresponds to a country with a TFP about 26% lower than the US level. For the "e¢ cient country", the coe¢ cient of Human Capital Intensity EPL would be equal to about -0.013, statistically signi…cant at 1%, which in turn would imply a yearly growth di¤erential of about 0.55% between sectors at the 75 th and 25 th percentile of human capital intensity in a country at the 25 th percentile of EPL compared with a country at the 75 th percentile of EPL. In turn, for the "less e¢ cient country", the coe¢ cient of Human Capital Intensity EPL would be almost halved as it would be equal to about only -0.007 (statistically signi…cant at 1%).
[Insert Table 10 about here]
In column 2 we repeat the same exercise, but including also the interaction of human capital intensity with years of schooling in 1970 and its improvement over the 1970-2000 period. Punctual estimates are virtually unaltered, although standard errors are higher, probably re ‡ecting a problem of multicollinearity. 44 Finally, in column 3 we repeat the same exercise but only for the period 1990-2005: again, EPL tends to have a stronger e¤ect in countries that are closer to the technological frontier. In this case, EPL would have a disproportionately signi…cant negative e¤ect in human capital intensive industries only for countries with a TFP no lower than 12 % of the US level in 1990, while it would be not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero for remaining countries.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we consider the e¤ect of employment protection legislation on industry growth. We …nd that EPL tends to have disproportionately negative e¤ects on the growth rate of value added and hours of work in more human capital intensive industries. We argue that human capital intensity re ‡ects di¤erences in technology adoption rates across industries and that …rms in sectors in which technical change is faster have higher requirements of adjusting employment. Hence, by letting technology adoption to depend on EPL in a model of growth with skill biased technological change, we study how …ring costs may have a relatively stronger impact in human capital intensive sectors in which technology adoption is faster.
Our empirical results indicate strong and statistically signi…cant negative e¤ects of higher levels of EPL on the growth rate of value added and hours of work in human capital intensive industries. This result is robust to a series of sensitivity checks. First, we have controlled for other determinants of industry growth by means of interactions between a country factor abundance and an industry factor intensity (e.g. industry schooling intensity and country education levels and growth; physical and R&D intensity and country capital to output ratio and R&D stock). Secondly, we have checked that EPL negatively a¤ects growth in human capital intensive industries even when it is also interacted with physical capital intensity, R&D intensity, sectoral riskiness or layo¤ rates at the industry level. Moreover, we have also controlled for the possibility that EPL might be picking up the e¤ects of other country characteristics by interacting human capital intensity with other country level variables, such as the level of …nancial development, the respect of property rights, the per capita income level, the degree of product market regulation and the degree of wage bargaining coordination among the others. Finally, we have taken into account possible endogeneity concerns of EPL. Our preferred estimates indicate a yearly value added growth di¤erential of 0.5-0.9% between the sector at the 75 th percentile and at the 25 th percentile of human capital intensity distribution in a country at the 25 th percentile of EPL compared with a country at the 75 th percentile of EPL.
We also …nd that the e¤ect of EPL on value added growth is stronger in the more recent years than during the 70s and 80s, and in the manufacturing than in the service sector; …nally, we show that EPL tends to disproportionately reduce growth in high schooling industries but particularly in countries that are closer to the technological frontier. We also report some evidence that EPL negatively in ‡uences TFP growth during the transition to the steady state. This con…rms our baseline result that EPL reduces growth in the more advanced countries and dynamic sectors of the economy.
Our analysis has also some implications for the relative dynamics of productivity and GDP growth of EU countries and the US over the last 40 years. As the growth literature suggests (see, for a recent example, Crafts and Toniolo, 2008) , GDP growth during the 1960s and 1970s was mainly driven by physical capital accumulation and TFP growth, resulting in an e¤ective catching up process between most EU countries and the US. In particular, in the decades after World War II, TFP growth in Europe was mainly achieved through a more e¢ cient use of inputs, exploitation of scale economies and the introduction of already well established technologies. In that environment, strong employment protection did not a¤ect the scope for catching up and the existence of a highly skilled workforce was probably not a necessary condition for achieving strong TFP growth. However, with the 1980s and especially the 1990s, sustainable high rates of GDP growth had to be achieved through strong productivity growth. As Aghion and Howitt (2006) suggest, after the catching up with the technological frontier had been completed, growth rates had to be more related to direct innovations and to the adoption of recently developed new technologies (like ICT, automated machinery, etc. whose implementation requires a more skilled workforce) that are more dependent than before on experimentation, short term relationships, better selections of workers and a more ‡exible labour market: as a result, more stringent EPL might have had a more detrimental impact on growth in the last two decades.
In order to provide some empirical evidence to back this conjecture, in Figure 2 we plot the di¤erence in average TFP growth (taken from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005) for the two decades after and before 1980 against average EPL during the observation period. The strong and signi…cant negative correlation (which may be observed also for labour productivity and GDP) suggests that countries with higher levels of EPL are those that experienced a slowdown in their growth rates during the most recent decades. Although purely suggestive, such evidence provides additional empirical support for our thesis that labour market institutions such as employment protection legislation, by altering the incentives to adopt and exploit the full potential of new technologies, might be an important channel to understand di¤erences in relative long run growth dynamics. In su ra n c e a n d p e n sio n fu n d S a le , m a inte n a n c e a n d re p a ir 0 .0 1 9 9 0 .0 0 4 6 1 1 .6 0 5 8 2 . Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include country and sector …xed e¤ects and interactions between human capital intensity and schooling levels and accumulation. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include country and sector …xed e¤ects.
